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ABSTRACT
Educationalists tend to imagine school curricula organised solely
around academic, formal knowledge or horizontal discourse. Yet,
despite curricula organised around vertical discourses such as
science, geography and mathematics, the working classes, the
poor and minority ethnically groups achieve less well in education
than the middle classes. The paper aims to re-think horizontal
knowledge by paying attention to it as place-based, sensory, embo-
died, indigenous and historically developed forms of knowing in
order: 1) to broaden debates about school knowledge; 2) to support
teachers to recognise and legitimate forms of knowing beyond
those prescribed by academic curricular and 3) to re-imagine it as
living knowledge that has value. To illuminate what might be
powerful in horizontal knowledge Gilbert Simondon’s genetic
ontology and his concepts of pre-individuation, persons are not
fixed for all time, and transindividual, a uniquely collective form of
knowing, are introduced. The paper argues that by re-thinking
horizontal knowledge young people can be imagined as having
multiple ways of being and education can support them to become
more; more than social class, more than poverty, more than an
exam failure and more than an individual, fixed for all time.
Introduction
Educationalists tend to imagine school curricula organised solely around academic, for-
mal knowledge. Debates about curriculum often invoke Bernstein’s (1990, 1999, 1996)
concepts of vertical and horizontal discourse. The superiority of vertical discourse epito-
mised by science, in comparison to horizontal discourse, is based on claims about its truth
or power (e.g., Young & Muller, 2013). Powerful knowledge is powerful because it is
publicly available in texts and so, the argument goes, can be made available to all
irrespective of young people’s lifeworlds. Yet, despite curricula organised around vertical
discourses such as science, geography and mathematics, the working classes, the poor
and minority ethnic groups achieve less well in education than the middle classes.
Bernstein’s ground-breaking work revealed that working-class orientations to the world
were different frommiddle class. Yet much of this early work on working-class knowledge
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remains underdeveloped and implicit in his definitions of horizontal discourse and knowl-
edge structures.
The paper aims to re-think horizontal knowledge by paying attention to it as place-
based, indigenous, historically developed forms of knowing in order: 1) to broaden
debates about school knowledge; 2) to support teachers to recognise and legitimate
forms of knowing beyond those prescribed by academic curricular and 3) to re-imagine it
as living knowledge that has value.
To bring to light what more might be involved in non-vertical knowledge, the paper
will provide i) case illustrations of such knowledge, ii) flesh out concepts such as affect,
sensory and embodied ways of being to illuminate what might be powerful in horizontal
knowledge and iii) will introduce concepts from Gilbert Simondon’s work. Simondon’s
genetic ontology requires a shift in thinking from decontextualised, transcendental, fixed
or dead categories, to knowledge made in the dynamic flow of life. To imagine horizontal
knowledge as living knowledge requires a revaluing of context dependent, situated or
profane knowledge, not as something that prevents people from gaining a critical aware-
ness of their lives, but as that which keeps life going on. The next section provides brief
case illustrations to introduce issues around horizontal knowledge.
The school gate as a threshold
Owain was aged 14 when we met him while undertaking longitudinal research in an ex-
coal mining valley in south Wales1. He said that each day at the school gate:
You unplug the iplayer, take off your hoodie, roll down your sleeves so they can’t see the
tattoos and put on the tie. . . .. As we’re getting off the bus, they’ll (the teachers) check we’re
wearing all our uniform and you haven’t got earrings in and . . . you have to hide everything
before you get off the bus.
Owain felt the need to hide his recent tattoo representing the pride he felt in having
a significant role in bringing up his baby cousin. He had already imagined himself as an
adult, following in his father’s footsteps in the building trade, and could envisage where
on the estate he would build his own house. He told us he belonged to a close-knit
family and had numerous relatives who lived within streets of one another. At school,
others in his class told us that Owain had outgrown the institution, although his
teachers told us he was doing well in the second to top class and was expected to
get some good GCSEs (public examinations taken at aged 16 years in the UK). Owain
explained that at the end of the school day, he took the bus home, changed clothes and
travelled to the nearest town to hang out with friends from another school, “doing
things we should not do”.
Jac, also aged 14, said he found being at school very difficult. He had a complicated
home background and when he found the pressure at school too challenging he
absented himself and went to his aunt’s place where she was building a house. He
explained that if he did not regularly absent himself from school in the afternoons, he
would not manage to attend school at all. He spoke with pride of his building-work and
being able to drive a tractor.
Owain managed the transition between home and school life relatively smoothly albeit
by undertaking rituals to hide elements that marked the grown-up status his family and
friends extended to him. Jac had a different technique for coping with stress in school. He
left lessons to practice the physical and skilled labour required to build a house.
We encountered many boys and girls in ex-coal mining towns who found school in
varying degrees irrelevant, boring and stressful, yet expressed a deep sense of belonging
to the place where they were growing up and all expressed a desire to achieve in life. We
came to recognise that belonging to large family networks, being entrusted with respon-
sible work such as bringing up children, caring for ill or disabled adults and building
houses buttressed some of the more deadening experiences of schooling. When they
spoke of experiences of developing skills such as riding motorbikes, mountain bikes and
horses, or practising sports such as boxing, rugby, martial arts and dance they came alive.
The ways of knowing and being that were valued in post-industrial places where we
worked can be characterised as closely related to practices, context-embedded and local.
This is the way Basil Bernstein, sociologist of education, characterised “horizontal dis-
course” (1996, p. 172). Yet, these ways of being that had to be left at the school gate. The
next section argues that the split between horizontal and vertical knowledge is deeply
rooted in Western cultures.
Vertical and horizontal discourse
Before re-thinking horizontal knowledge, it is worth briefly rehearsing what led to the
typology of knowledge that enshrined the terms horizontal and vertical in current
debates about curricula. Basil Bernstein developed a typology of knowledge in his later
work (1990, 1996). There are some resonances between Bernstein’s concepts of vertical
and horizontal discourse and an anthropological distinction between the sacred and
profane. Referring to Durkheim, Bernstein characterised the profane as the world of
sensory representations and the scared as arbitrary conceptual relations that carry no
necessity (1996, p. 169). In his later work, Bernstein referred less to knowledge as codes, in
line with his earlier work on working and middle-class socio-linguistic codes, and adopted
Foucault’s concept of discourse to describe formal and everyday forms of knowledge. His
typology runs from vertical to horizontal discourses, which broadly aligns with the
anthropological concepts of sacred and profane, and abstract and concrete thinking.
Durkheim introduced the concepts of arbitrary and non-arbitrary to describe abstract
and concrete thinking. In Western philosophy, arbitrary, or sacred knowledge, is asso-
ciated with the pre-modern era dominated by religious thought, such that the only
recognised form of knowledge belonged to God or gods and was made available to
man [sic] through scared texts such as the Bible. Sacred knowledge was imagined to be
fixed for all-time and so was transcendental. Other forms of knowing such as crafts of
making, healing and commerce did not carry the status of sacred knowledge. Following
the Enlightenment and the invention of the scientific method often associated with
Francis Bacon, knowledge was imagined to grow according to hypotheses that were
open to empirical disproof. In the modern era, knowledge was imagined to be created by
scientists and represented as codes, concepts and principles, which could be dissemi-
nated widely through scholarly handbooks, journals and textbooks. Knowledge was no
longer possessed by gods and fixed for all-time in a transcendental realm, and instead was
open to discovery. Debates about the superiority of scientific knowledge in relation to
other disciplines such as the humanities and social sciences have been ongoing and
contentious, depicted as the science wars (see, e.g., Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 1–13; Stengers,
2010, p. 1–13).
To some extent, Bernstein’s typology of knowledge follows the modernist tradition of
valuing scientific knowledge above all others. Within vertical discourse, he defines a range
of types of knowledge according to their structure. He imagined the logic of a discipline as
the conventions or rules according to which ideas can be aligned. Generally, Bernstein
was thinking of the logics developed by academics in universities. He described the
structure of scientific knowledge as explicit, coherent, systematically principled and
hierarchically organised (Bernstein, 1996, p. 172).
The principle of the structuring of this knowledge moves the realizations towards more and
more general propositions which integrate knowledge at lower levels and across an expand-
ing range of apparently different phenomena. (Bernstein, 1996, p. 173)
Bernstein characterised the structure of social scientific knowledge as segmentally orga-
nised “as a series of expanding, non-translatable, specialized languages, with non-
comparable principles of different, often opposed, assumption” (1996, p. 173). Horizontal
knowledge progresses by “addition of another specialized language” (p. 173). Horizontal
knowledge builds outward according to a logic of seriality adding or appropriating new
territories.
In Bernstein’s typology, horizontal discourse is not given the status of formal knowl-
edge and refers to everyday or common-sense thinking described as:
. . . likely to be oral, local, context dependent and specific, tacit, multi-layered, and contra-
dictory across but not within contexts . . . the crucial feature is that it is segmentally organised.
(Bernstein, 1999, p. 159)
Horizontal discourses share many features with horizontal knowledge structures in that
they are context-specific and are “contradictory across but not within contexts” (1999,
p. 159). I find resonances between horizontal discourse and Bernstein’s earlier work on
different social class orientations to the world, yet such connections remain implicit in his
work. Before explicating what more might be considered as horizontal knowledge and
discourse, the next section considers briefly how claims about the superiority of scientific
knowledge.
To describe disciplinary or formal knowledge according to different structures or logics,
as Bernstein does, is highly contentions and is widely debated in the field of Science and
Technology Studies (STS). Scholars such as Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway argue that
claiming scientific knowledge is more valid, more rational and more true than other forms
of knowledge involves a carry-over from the pre-modern era when knowledge was ima-
gined to be transcendental, as if it lies outside and above the human and natural worlds.
While the general laws, principles and concepts developed within a specific field of science
are highly useful within that disciplinary for understanding phenomena, once they are
applied to other disciplinary fields or everyday life they do not necessarily work well.
Stengers (2010) cautions that the transcendent power attributed to abstract, scientific
concepts translates them into seemingly immutable facts. In line with Latour, she points
to how so-called “facts” developed in one area of science are taken up (or recontextua-
lised to use Bernstein’s term) in everyday discourse and become “factishes” (Stengers,
2010, p. 19). She uses examples such as neutrinos, DNA, genes and innate intelligence (IQ).
The vastness of the transcendental gets stuck to what might have started as a specific fact
and over inflates it. She imagines factishes stalking the social world as monsters. We can
only reduce these monsters to size by recognising that abstract generalisations are
specific to the contexts where such phenomena were coaxed into view.
Scientists can be complicit in hiding the messy entanglements of social practices,
discourse and technological instruments that create scientific facts (Haraway, 1991;
Stengers, 2010). Stengers reveal the underbelly of science’s so-called powerful knowledge
and shows how it creates an overwhelming reality that distorts or hides other realities. In
effect, concepts such as IQ become dominant discourses in Foucault’s terms. Accordingly,
scientific worlds and their monsters dominate us giving a sense that humans are impotent
and stuck. To demonstrate how science dominates and occludes other ways of knowing,
the next section takes a trip into the underground world of coal mining to make
horizontal knowledge visible. It starts by painting a picture of how horizontal knowledge
is entangled with place, geology, community life, corporeality and time.
Knowledge in place
Miners’ knowledge can be characterised, arguably, as horizontal discourse or knowledge
in Bernstein’s typology (see Gamble, 2014). Coal mining communities grew up in specific
places and developed forms of knowledge through the necessity to survive. The south
Wales coalfields were formed millions of years ago when geological folds created by
shifting tectonic plates, compressed coniferous matter deep underground. Today, mines
involve a labyrinth of underground tunnels and caverns hewn out of rock. To become
a miner required developing a specific kind of mentality, an embodied orientation to
danger. I use these terms to hint of resonances with Bernstein’s early work on working-
class orientations to meaning (1973, 1974). Unlike artisanal crafts associated with the pre-
industrial era, where tools and activities could travel, the technical ensemble of coal
mining is profoundly rooted in the place where natural resources lie in specific geological
formations (Simondon, 2017, p. 228).
Between the 1890s and 1920s, ex-mining valleys in south Wales grew from sparsely
populated farming communities to globally important industrial centres within
a relatively short time span. Mining communities expanded in landscapes of steep
valleys above the coal seams. Coal was initially mined close to the surface using simple
tools such as shovels, pickaxes and buckets. Up to the 1842 Act, whole families worked
12–14 hour shifts underground in cramped and dangerous conditions. The period of
industrial mining saw mechanised lift cages drop groups of up to 50 men hundreds of
metres below ground where they travelled along intricate corridors supported by pit
props with ventilation systems and tracks on which trolleys laden with coal were pulled
upward to the surface.
The decline of the mining industry in south Wales was steady yet slow from the 1930s
to the present day. Then in the 1980s, the remaining mines were closed after violent
confrontations between the police and community members who were trying to save
their livelihoods. Today, in post-industrial times, mining places remain some of the most
economically deprived and poorest in the UK (Ivinson et al., 2018; Social Mobility
Commission, 2017).
As part of our ongoing longitudinal work in the south Wales valleys, my students and
I visited the National Museum for Wales. An ex-collier led us on an underground tour and
explained the techniques of mining embellished with vivid personal stories of what used
to happen underground. Below is an extract of the fieldnotes:
The tour involved a visceral, embodied, walking, stooping, encounter with rock, darkness and
damp air. We had to lower our heads, to avoid banging them on the stone roof of tunnels that
sloped into recesses where new coalfaces would have been hewn. Our hard hats were
equipped with lamps that sliced through the utter, total darkness. We adopt reptilian-like
body movements to feel our way. Persons, place, texture and matter created moving
assemblages as we journey underground in what was an affective encounter, haunted with
the past, present and (non) future of mining, laden with the heavy, on-going, mourning of the
mine closures. Faced with an audience, the ex-collier bantered with us and told stories with
pride of life underground. He gave us a sense of the chemistry of methane gasses and its
dangers as it escaped from fissures in splitting rock. He sensitised us to the feel of rock, the
smell of air and changes in temperature that can only be gained through long exposure to
the place and having laboured with the tools of mining over time. Down here the collier came
alive. The aliveness of the man entangled with the underground environment was in stark
contrast to the depression, mental illness, and economic death of the community above
ground.
The collier’s knowledge has been formed by routines such as walking for miles under-
ground before reaching the rock-face and of being enclosed with others, in close
proximity in caged lifts. A split second could make the difference between being safe
and in danger and so learning to attune to slight changes in the environment was
crucial. A growing range of studies on embodied knowledge is providing useful con-
cepts to illuminate the highly complex sensory and embodied sensibilities that miners
acquire.
Studies in the field of social anthropology challenge notions of the body as bounded,
rational and contained (Mellor & Shilling, 1997). Ethnographic studies of sports such
boxing (Bull, Gilroy, Howes, & Kahn, 2006; Wacquant, 2004; Woodward, 2008), running
(Allen-Collinson & Owton, 2015) and dancing (Potter, 2008) describe the trans-boundary
capacities of heat, touch and smell, which blur the separation of bodies and environ-
ments. For example, athletes undertake warming-up exercised to elongate their muscles
develop a heightened experience of heat as a perception that is felt within the body and
yet relates to the external environment (Potter, 2008). Warming up involves both physical
and psychological sensations as people feel an increase in energy. Touch, a sense that has
low status in Western cultures, is said to be the least mediated by cognition (Classen,
1993; Moulton, 2010). In effect, Western cultures have a restricted range of concepts to
describe touch. Yet, we only have to watch a blind person exploring artefacts in a museum
through touch to realise the human potential to develop tactile sensibilities. The value
given to sensory knowledge varies across cultures and eras. For example, in Latin
American, the Mayan and Tzotzil people recognise heat as a basic force of the universe
and have a highly elaborated thermal symbolism. For them, heat is symbolically related to
the life cycle and is central to rituals of marriage and baptism (Allen-Collinson & Owton,
2015). Sensations such as heat and touch emerge within a self-body-society nexus (Allen-
Collinson & Owton, 2015). I want to make a link between cultural variations in how
different sensory registers are more or less elaborated and the development of sensory
affordances within mining communities. We can extend the self-body-society nexus to
include place and in the case of mining, place involves a specific geological, dynamic
underground environment.
Mining communities have developed highly elaborated, multi-sensorial attunements
to the underground environment so they could detect the slightest change in the atmo-
sphere driven by the need to stay safe. For example, the ability to detect a specific sound,
such as the popping of wood, enables them to anticipate the imminent collapse of a pit
prop (Sauer, 1998). This heightened awareness allows miners to detect extremely slight
differences in sound, touch, smell or feel. Miners refer to this sixth sense as pit sense
(Sauer, 1998). Pit sense develops over the time, is specific to place and it transmitted
though bodily practice passed on by groups of mines.
Simondon (2017) described miners’ embodied knowledge as taking place in union
with nature where boundaries between bodies-environment-intuition are folded in
a Deleuzian sense. Before pursuing theories that overcome boundaries between bodies-
environments-place-culture in more detail, there is one last point to make with regards to
Elizabeth Sauer’s study.
Sauer’s study examined accident reports in the mining industry. Miners were inter-
viewed following accidents as part of the process of reviewing safety. The technical
editors of the safety manuals describe risk using scientific categorise such as “load”,
“pressure” and “compression” from disciplines such as physics, geology and chemistry.
Even when miners explained in their terms how accidents took place their accounts did
not make it into the safety manuals. By using scientific concepts that are detached, de-
contextualised and generalised, miners’ complex, multi-sensorial, embodied knowledge,
pit sense was erased. The manuals erase horizontal knowledge and in this case, scientific
knowledge looks more like superior arrogance that dismisses the difference between
theory and practice (Stengers, 2010, p. 3). The next section returns to stories about the
origins of ideas about knowledge such as those that inspired Bernstein’s typology of
knowledge to introduce the work of Gilbert Simondon.
From knowing to being
In rethink horizontal knowledge, Simondon’s (2017) genetic ontology provides a useful
alternative account that focuses on the development of technical objects across time.
I refer again to mining to introduce concepts such as the collective transindividual.
Miners share a uniquely collective form of knowing in which humans and nature are
fused or folded. The popping sound created when a wooden pit prop cracks is detected
intuitively in a microsecond as a feeling that something is not right. Pit sense is trans-
mitted across generations of miners. To remain safe, miners induct newcomers into
become open and hyper-attentive to the sounds, smells, feel and touch of the under-
ground environment and distil in them a sense of collective responsibility, because each
miner depends absolutely on others for their safety. We might imagine the underground
as a liminal space (Hughes, 2014) where miners are saturated by nature through a multi-
sensorial, immersive awareness. This beingness comes from miners working as
a connected organism sensing together as they inhabit the underground world; some-
thing akin to a blind animal sensing and feeling as it burrows within the earth. In effect,
the thinking takes place in a living environment, where the inner and exterior worlds are
merged. In a Deleuze (1993) sense, the inside is folded onto the outside, as environment.
To capture this sense of unity between humans and nature, Simondon invokes a collective
transindividual world (Combes, 2013; Hughes, 2014).
Pit sense is not a cognitive knowing. This kind of embodied knowing surpasses or is
more than individual cognition. Muriel Combes writing about Simondon calls this “the
intimacy of the commons” (2013, p. 40). If such thinking does not belong inside a human
mind, then where does it take place? The answer according to Simondon requires some
quite radical rethinking of the bounded, rational subject that Western philosophy inher-
ited from Descartes.
Simondon, along with other post-human, and new materialist thinkers such as Rosi
Braidotti, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari look back to the seventieth century philoso-
pher, Baruch Spinoza, who argued against Descartes’ separation of subjectivity-
environment, God-nature and mind-body. Simondon argued that God and Nature were
different names for the same thing. This alternative story recognises forms of knowing,
such as pit sense as feelings that arise in the dynamic flow of life. Feelings are registered
before sensation becomes rational, conscious thought. Yet in a more radical vein,
Simondon elevates such pre-conscious, embodied thinking to a high status, indeed it
supplants transcendental knowledge. He follows Spinoza to suggest that what unites
people and enables the social organisation to emerge is not arbitrary or transcendent
concepts that are discursive, detached and consensus dependent but natural, or pertain-
ing to nature. Specifically, he argues that what humans share, they share through their
belonging to a common nature. In a way, Spinoza places Descartes’ God in nature. In
effect, he grounds the origins of social life in nature, and thus in the “real”. The next
section presents Simondon’s alternative story of the history of ideas.
Collective individuation
Simondon (2017) starts with the in-between, not with knowledge or subjects but with the
development of technical objects across eras. For him, life emerges with technology and
technical objects such as the pickaxe, the internal combustion engine and, in contem-
porary times, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Simondon rejects the subject-object
division that imagined a unified and autonomous Cartesian subject as the centre of
knowledge. He insists that human beings are not defined according to “essences” that
lie either in an interior, such as the psyche imagined by Freud, or in the exterior such as
social organisations described by Marx and Durkheim (Barthélémy, 2012, p. 205). He
emphasises how the invention of technical objects set up processes that generated splits
between a once unified plane that humans shared with nature. Accordingly, “psycholo-
gical individuation does not pre-exist, ready made” (Combes, 2013, p. 39) as a condition
from which collective life emerges. Simondon starts the other way round; for him,
collective life is part of nature and comes before subjectivity. As Joe Hughes suggests:
both the psychic and the collective are co-produced through the “elaboration” of the
transindividual, a process of individuation which cuts across individuals, putting them in
relation to one another on the basis of their preindividual realities (Hughes, 2014, npn).
Simondon describes four temporal phases and each creates a different split between
humans and the world. The way to imagine this is that successive splits followed from the
development of increasingly sophisticated technical objects, yet not only is the human
split from some imagined external world; these splits create new worlds, or regimes and
new ways of orienting to them, which in turn create new forms of individuation. The first
phase is characterised by a union between nature and humans. Here the human is
characterised as pre-individual, and what connects humans is their pre-human nature
(Hughes, 2014 citing Combes, 2013, p. 48). In this regime, the human is fundamentally
a collective being, a transindividual.
As Hughes (2014) points out, Simondon’s notion of the transindividual starts from
a tension. We need to imagine the subject made up of two unequal parts, the individual
and what the pre-individual shares with nature.
Insofar as the subject’s preindividual share always exceeds the limits of the individual, the
relationship between the two parts is in a state of permanent tension. The tension between
these two levels is experienced as affectivity, an internal relation to the outside (Simondon
ILFI 252, cited in Hughes, 2014).
What humans share with nature will always exceed who they can become as persons. The
tension is experienced below the level of conscious awareness as affect. To become
a person, or to become individuated cannot be achieved on one’s own; it requires
a collective. No person can achieve full psychic stability on their own, it has to join with
what “surpasses it while accompanying it” (Combes, 2013, p. 40). In a simplified form,
affect becomes perceived as emotion in the process of resolving the tension and provides
a driving force to become a person, to survive, and to live in the intimacy of the commons.
The early phase is characterised by a magical unity between man [sic] and the world
(Simondon, 2017, p. 177). In this pre-historical (primitive) phase humans share non-
conscious intelligence with animals and other beings through processes of phylogenesis
(e.g., Wilson, 2015). In this era, structures in the universe are given by movement and
place (Simondon, 2017, p. 178). Without structure, there would be continuous time and
space. Structures are key-places that keep hold of the forces contained in the ground
(fond) of reality that supports them. Such places might be enclosures or passages, and
sacred places such as elevated peaks occupied by, for example, the lord of the mountain
(p. 178). Simondon suggests they “localize and focalize the attitudes of the living vis a vis
its milieu” (p. 178).
I wish to suggest that mines are physical places that hold the forces contained in the
ground. I suspect this is why when the unemployed miners looked back to their mining
days, they spoke of those times with extraordinary levels of satisfaction and many told us
they were the best days of their lives, despite the dangers. They always spoke of the
camaraderie experienced with others underground. Underground they were in
a collective unity with others and with living nature. They spoke with a unique kind of
pride about mining work and we had the impression that they worked in unison as
a collective organism, highly attuned to the liveliness of nature. In this way, they were in
touch with that which surpasses individuation while accompanying it. They merged with
nature while accompanying it. For Simondon, the transindividual is where the individual
relates to him or herself in the very act of relating to others and here we can add a further
form of relating; that of relating also to the ongoing life of nature.
The three phases outlined by Simondon correspond to different versions of subjectiv-
ity. The term individuation is used to emphasise movement and becoming rather than
a fixed, unified subject. The first split separated man [sic] from a (primitive) magical world
where he [sic] was unified with nature. This split, instigated by the invention of technical
tools, spawned the world, or regime, of religion imagined above and a world of technics
below, as two sides of the same coin. For Simondon, regimes have theoretical and
practical modes. The second split created the regimes of science and ethics. Science
grew into domains of knowledge such as physics, chemistry and geology. The first phase
created pre-individuation and the second phase created vital individuation, followed by
psychic individuation, which is a transitory phase and finally the psycho-social individua-
tion of post-modernity. We can imagine these are different orientations to meanings and
different kinds of worldings.
Yet, the important point for this paper is that there is a continuous and ongoing
rationality between forms of being associated with phases.
A being, considered as individuated, can in fact exist according to several phases that are
present at the same time, and it can change phases in itself; there is a plurality in being that is
not the plurality of parts. (Barthélémy, 2012, p. 226).
We might say that vestiges of each phase’s forms of thought continue to be alive and
available as parts of the culture in technical objects and become present again in
moments of creative change. The colliers’ pit sense mentioned above, is an instinctive,
or vital knowing that only develops when experiences of successive generations create
the conditions of perception, and the essential mental structures to adapt to the
milieu (Simondon, 2017). A heightened awareness of sound, smell and imminent
danger come from a long legacy of mining practice passed on through generations
working in a specific underground milieu. When the mines closed, losing their jobs
gave the miners a new individuation of unemployment. This split between having
a social purpose and becoming “a drain on society” and worthless was imposed by the
logic of capitalism. Capitalism split the men from their milieu. My story of going
underground suggests that some men have at least two subjectivities – above and
below ground, and they move between them within the same day. Accordingly past,
present and future do not follow sequential linearity but are folded into contexts and
practices.
Simondon’s account helps us to imagine that instead of one form of knowledge
overturning another, humans come into being through a plurality of connections with
a multiplicity of worlds, and a world is not there once and for all. The concept of milieu
helps to capture the dynamic movement of life with human beingness and enables us to
recognise instinct, intuition, and practical forms of knowing related to the eras of magic,
religion and science co-existing, yet having different origins. Pre-individuation becomes
individuated according to the milieu or ensemble through which it finds life and expres-
sion. Accordingly, there is no individuation without milieu.
In the earlier example, Owain came into being different in the contexts of school,
home, and with his peer or among relatives. Accordingly, a human being is not motivated
to know, so much as to live or survive. Knowledge is always directed at problems thrown
up by the life course as lived. By placing living necessity before knowledge, we can hear
young people’s pleas that school is boring and irrelevant in a different way. The need to
know comes from the milieu in which they are living as when Jac learns to drive a tractor
to help with his aunt’s building work.
Movements in place
As young people appropriate corporeal activities in mining communities they invent,
transform and recast practices passed down from older generations. These corporeal
practices and movements include features that mimetically resonate with past practices
of mining and farming such as being outdoors, being physically active, developing skills
and gaining muscle strength. Riding motor bikes (Ivinson, 2014a) and helping to build
a house mimetically reference and point to rituals of the past reactivated in the present
that potentially change and create something new for all participants (Wulf, 2011). These
activities are not a straightforward reproduction of past practices; they include conflicts,
struggles and tensions. Skilled bodily performances are shaped by contemporary expres-
sion of power relations and by virtual media that at the same time accept and question
a given social order.
Mining is one example of a specialist physical activity. Trades such as groundwork,
plastering, and plumbing also involve corporeal dexterities that are entangled with
technical knowledge in specific ways. Young peoples’ activities such as building and
motor-biking are shaped by past techniques to create altogether new co-compositions
involving place, techniques, terrain and social bonds. These micro-worldings resonate
with a kind of known-unknown of the past reverberating in the present.
When the miner acts instinctively to sense danger, he is acting according to
a motivation to survive. It is a feeling generated in the event; a force that propels being;
a non-human impersonal intuition to survive, like a flower bending towards the light of
the sun. It is this impersonal force that is the basis of true collective action according to
Simondon. It is the feeling of solidarity that kept the miners alive and that might, if given
half a chance, re-generate post-industrial communities.
Groups connected to places, landscape and local contexts where specific practices
have developed over time, have different sensitivities and perceptual registers to those
living in urban towns, for example. We are in danger of losing these visceral, embodied,
socially situated ways of knowing if we fail to value, recognise and encourage them.
Implication for education
Another educational theorist with an interested in what humans share with nature is Lev
Vygotsky. In his work, the natural line of development or phylogenetic line relates to what
humans share with upper primates. Educationalists tend to focus on Vygotsky’s cultural
line and its importance for the development of higher forms of mental functioning (e.g.,
Wertsch, 1985, p. 48) while ignoring the natural line of development. According to
Vygotsky, what makes humans different to animals is the zone of proximal development
(ZDP) where the natural line of development referred to as intrapsychic crosses the
cultural or interpsychic line. The ZDP is a “dynamic region of sensitivity in which the
transition from intrapsychological to interpsychological functioning can be made”
(Wertsch, 1985, p. 67). The reason why Vygotsky developed the ZDP was because it
points, not to the mental function a child already has but to what the child can potentially
become. Vygotsky’s developmental psychology is more in accord with Spinoza’s dynamic
subjectification than Descartes’ notion of the bounded subject (Ivinson 2012, 159). The
ZDP creates a new interdependency between the self and the other and, and as
Padadopoulos (2011) suggests this is Vygotsky’s equivalent of the liminal space where
processes of individuation take place.
Simondon’s work enables us to expand Vygotsky’s notion of the ZDP. Most often
educationalists recognise the interpsychological line of development as the cultural line
made available to novices through teachers and other experts with the support of
mediating tools. Language is the primary cultural tool in Vygotsky’s work. Simondon
provides a story about the development of technical objects or tools and so elaborates
further relations between culture and nature and so between the intra (mental), and inter-
psychic (cultural) lines of development.
Simondon enables us to imagine culture not as a single line, so much as multiple, made
up of the sediment layers created by the development of technical objects relating to the
magical, religious and scientific eras. As a child comes in contact with different kinds of
cultural tools, she becomes oriented to meanings, at times as vital, psychic and psycho-
social individuations. Becoming, then, can be imagined as multiple processes of indivi-
duation involving a plurality of relationships with tools, others, nature and landscapes
within milieux, such as home, community and school.
When thinking about dynamic subjectification, we can think of processes of becoming
through play, intergenerational activities specific to place and schooling. Play allows
a child to be fully, intensely, immersed or fused with ongoing life. Deleuze & Guattari,
(1987/2014, p. 179) associate this with jouissance and vital individuation. Maybe when
taking part in physical and technical activities, such as playing a sport or riding motor-
bikes, becoming involves psychic individuation. In the mining communities of south
Wales, these kinds of activities share some of the miners’ transindividuation where body-
self-other-place are folded. Young people’s activities reverberate with indigenous ways of
knowing that are still part of the ongoing ways of knowing and surviving in communities.
Maybe when taking part in subject lessons, becoming involves psycho-social individua-
tions and involves making meaning oriented through the guiding principles of disciplin-
ary logics within ecologies (Stengers, 2010) of formal discourses, such as science and art.
Some implications are: i) there are diverse tools associated with pre-history, the religious
and the scientific regimes, ii) these are still available today, iii) each enables humans tomake
connections and become in different ways, and so inhabit different regimes or worlds
where the rules of engagement are specific to that ecology. Thus we, and the children and
young people we teach, have a multiplicity of ways of being, relating and knowing.
Simondon’s work has wide implications for re-thinking learning and expanding the imagi-
native purview of intra-actions (Barad, 2007) between knowing and worlding.
We can recognise that Owain and Jac become different as they enter the school gate,
a building site and their family homes and that eachmilieu affords them an ongoing sense
of becoming. If we can imagine a multiplicity of pre-individuations as young people strive
to survive, belong and develop a personality, then we can start to value and acknowledge
their diverse lifeworlds. Education involves opening up evermore lifeworlds such as those
of science, geography, art and sport, without denying that some regimes enable some
young people to become a person more than others. Re-thinking horizontal knowledge
will enable some young people to become more; more than social class, more than
poverty, more than an exam failure and more that an individual, fixed for all time. It
enables us to imagine education bringing young people into a multiplicity of worlds and
so to encounter the excesses that we humans share in common, with nature and with
others. The beautiful risk for educators presented in this paper is to think beyond the
unified, autonomous Cartesian subject as the centre of knowledge and to work with and
not against the power of living knowledge.
Note
1. The paper draws on a succession of studies conducted between 2006 and 2018 in the ex-
mining and steel producing valleys of south Wales. Three studies were conducted in schools
and communities in south Wales ex-mining valley communities: (1) on young people’s
understandings of skill in the Llynfil Valley in primary and secondary schools between
2006–2010; (2) on young people’s understandings of place, in schools and communities in
the Cynon Valley, called the Young People and Place (PI Ivinson) project between 2010–2013,
and (3) on young people’s sense of wellbeing in schools and communities in the Taff Valley
between 2013–2018 as part of Productive Margins: Regulating for Engagement project, and
was called Making, Mapping and Mobilising in Merthyr.
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